Payment for performance in the Family Health Programme: lessons from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework / Pagamento para desempenho no Programa Saúde da Família: lições do Quality and Outcomes Framework da Inglaterra

OBJECTIVE: Payment for performance financial incentive schemes reward doctors based on the quality and the outcomes of their treatment. In Brazil, the Ministry of Health is looking to scale up its use in public hospitals and some municipalities are developing payment for performance schemes even for the Family Health Programme. In this article the Quality and Outcomes Framework used in the UK since 2004 is discussed, as well as its experience to elaborate some important lessons that Brazilian municipalities should consider before embarking on payment for performance scheme in primary care settings.

OBJETIVO: Esquemas de pagamento para desempenho recompensam o médico baseado na qualidade e no resultado do tratamento dos seus pacientes. O Ministério da Saúde brasileiro analisa seu uso em hospitais públicos e alguns municípios estão desenvolvendo estratégias de pagamento por desempenho para o Programa de Saúde da Família. No artigo discute-se o Quality and Outcomes Framework - esquema de pagamento para desempenho usado no Reino Unido desde 2004, bem como sua experiência para elaborar algumas lições importantes que os municípios brasileiros devem considerar antes de empreender o esquema de pagamento por desempenho na atenção primária.

Designing an Effective Pay-for-performance System in the Korean National Health Insurance / 예방의학회지

The challenge facing the Korean National Health Insurance includes what to spend money on in order to elevate the 'value for money.' This article reviewed the changing issues associated with quality of care in the Korean health insurance system and envisioned a picture of an effective pay-for-performance (P4P) system in Korea taking into consideration quality of care and P4P systems in other countries. A review was made of existing systematic reviews and a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development survey. An effective P4P in Korea was envisioned as containing three features: measures, basis for reward, and reward. The first priority is to develop proper measures for both efficiency and quality. For further improvement of quality indicators, an electronic system for patient history records should be built in the near future. A change in the level or the relative ranking seems more desirable than using absolute level alone for incentives. To stimulate medium- and small-scale hospitals to join the program in the next phase, it is suggested that the scope of application be expanded and the level of incentives adjusted. High-quality indicators of clinical care quality should be mapped out by combining information from medical claims and information from patient registries.

Lessons From Healthcare Providers' Attitudes Toward Pay-for-performance: What Should Purchasers Consider in Designing and Implementing a Successful Program? / 예방의학회지

We conducted a systematic review to summarize providers' attitudes toward pay-for-performance (P4P), focusing on their general attitudes, the effects of P4P, their favorable design and implementation methods, and concerns. An electronic search was performed in PubMed and Scopus using selected keywords including P4P. Two reviewers screened target articles using titles and abstract review and then read the full version of the screened articles for the final selections. In addition, one reference of screened articles and one unpublished report were also included. Therefore, 14 articles were included in this study. Healthcare providers' attitudes on P4P were summarized in two ways. First, we gathered their general attitudes and opinions regarding the effects of P4P. Second, we rearranged their opinions regarding desirable P4P design and implementation methods, as well as their concerns. This study showed the possibility that some healthcare providers still have a low level of awareness about P4P and might prefer voluntary participation in P4P. In addition, they felt that adequate quality indicators and additional support for implementation of P4P would be needed. Most healthcare providers also had serious concerns that P4P would induce unintended consequences. In order to conduct successful implementation of P4P, purchaser should make more efforts such as increasing providers' level of awareness about P4P, providing technical and educational support, reducing their burden, developing a cooperative relationship with providers, developing more accurate quality measures, and minimizing the unintended consequences.

Korean National Health Insurance Value Incentive Program: Achievements and Future Directions / 예방의학회지

Since the reformation of the National Health Insurance Act in 2000, the Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service (HIRA) in the Republic of Korea has performed quality assessments for healthcare providers. The HIRA Value Incentive Program (VIP), established in July 2007, provides incentives for excellent-quality institutions and disincentives for poor-quality ones. The program is implemented based on data collected between July 2007 and December 2009. The goal of the VIP is to improve the overall quality of care and decrease the quality gaps among healthcare institutions. Thus far, the VIP has targeted acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and Caesarian section (C-section) care. The incentives and disincentives awarded to the hospitals by their composite quality scores of the AMI and C-section scores. The results of the VIP showed continuous and marked improvement in the composite quality scores of the AMI and C-section measures between 2007 and 2010. With the demonstrated success of the VIP project, the Ministry of Health and Welfare expanded the program in 2011 to include general hospitals. The HIRA VIP was deemed applicable to the Korean healthcare system, but before it can be expanded further, the program must overcome several major concerns, as follows: inclusion of resource use measures, rigorous evaluation of impact, application of the VIP to the changing payment system, and expansion of the VIP to primary care clinics.